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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

t

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

:

Case No. 900448-CA

t

LARRY BEN GARCIA,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Category No. 2

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of distribution and/or
arranging the distribution of a controlled substance, to wit,
cocaine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
58-37-8(1) (Supp. 1990).

This Court has jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The only issue presented in this appeal is whether
there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to sustain
defendant's conviction for distribution and/or arranging to
distribute cocaine?
The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is
whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt of
defendant's guilt.

State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah

1989); State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of any provisions, statutes or rules upon
which the state relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 9, 1990, defendant, Larry Ben Garcia, and his
cousin, Robert Garcia, were charged with distribution and/or
arranging to distribute a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine,
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(l)(b) (Supp. 1990) (R. 1). Subsequently, in May, 1990, the
complaint was amended to include the offense of being a habitual
criminal (R. 9). Prior to trial, Robert Garcia pled guilty to a
felony charge of distribution (T. 137).
On July 3, 1990, defendant's bifurcated jury trial
commenced before the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, Second Judicial
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah (R. 27). On July 6,
1990, the jury returned a verdict of guilty to the felony
distribution charge (R. 30, 72). The jury then heard evidence
regarding defendant being a habitual criminal and also returned a
verdict of guilty to that offense (R. 30-31, 71).
On July 16, 1990, defendant entered a guilty plea to a
second felony charge of distribution of a controlled substance
(Sentencing Transcript at 2).

On the same day, defendant was

sentenced in the instant case to the statutory term of one to
fifteen years, which sentence was enhanced, under the habitual
criminal provision, to five years to life (R. 32, 37). On the
guilty plea count, he was sentenced to the statutory term of one
to fifteen years to run concurrently with this sentence
(Sentencing T. 2-3).
-2-

Defendant did not appeal from his guilty plea
conviction but did file a notice of appeal in this case on August
16, 1990 (R. 75).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Weber County Narcotics Strike Force had targeted
Robert Garcia, defendant's cousin, as a potential source for the
purchase of cocaine.

Utilizing both a confidential informant and

an undercover reserve police officer, the police had arranged to
purchase cocaine from Robert Garcia in exchange for stolen
clothing merchandise (T. 42).
Tracy Ericson, the undercover officer utilized, has
been a part-time reserve officer with the Ogden City Police
Department since December, 1984. As such, she is POST-certified
in the same manner as any police officer and may "act in the
capacity of a police officer with most of the authority of a
regular officer" (T. 14). She receives no compensation for her
police work and usually works fifteen to twenty hours per week
(T. 14). Usually she works in narcotics and has often worked in
an undercover capacity (T. 15)•
On March 30, 1990, Reserve Officer Ericson and the
confidential informant went to Robert Garcia's residence at 2055
Adams Street, Ogden, Utah (T.17, 19). They had expected to met
Robert there.

Instead, his cousin, defendant Larry Garcia,

answered the door and told the informant that Robert was not
there but, that they could come in the house and wait for him (T.
19).
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Officer Ericson and the informant went into the house
and waited for Robert for twenty to thirty minutes (T. 21, 46).
During that time, Ericson, the informant and defendant were
seated in the dining room and a table.

Defendant was seated next

to Ericson and the room was fairly well lit" (T. 20-21).
Periodically, the informant and defendant attempted to locate
Robert by telephone (T. 20). When Robert could not be located,
Ericson made up an excuse to leave the home so that she could
confer with her police colleagues who were providing backup
assistance (T. 21-22, 44-45, 66-68).
Ericson and the informant met with the police about a
block away from the residence.

They decided to have the

informant call the Adams Street residence to see if Robert had
been located.

She did and was informed by defendant that he had

located Robert at Poncho's, a local restaurant and bar (T. 2223).
Ericson and the informant drove back to Adams Street,
picked up defendant and proceeded to Poncho's to get Robert (T.
23).

During the five minute drive to Poncho's, defendant sat on

the driver's side of the back seat, Ericson sat on the passenger
side of the front seat, and the informant drove (T. 23-24).

At

Poncho's, the informant and defendant went inside, got Robert,
and all three returned to the vehicle (T. 24).
The four then returned to Adams Street.

On the way,

Robert and Ericson discussed
the price of the clothing and how much
cocaine I [Ericson] could get for the
merchandise. He [Robert Garcia] told me that
I could have a gram and a half, and I told
-4-

him I wanted two grams because the property
was worth over $300. And he said okay . . .
(i

tlley got to the Garcia residence, Robert took the

bag of what Ericson had represented to be stolen clothing n• I
went into the house with defendant 11

1v a

n,

gold wrHic urn. i i the cocaine was delivered (T. 25).
After a few minutes, defendant returned to the vehicle
and handed Ericson a " litt.lo baggy of i ;hite powdery substance"
(T. 26), Defendant told her that Robert was in the house making
up another baggy to exchange for the watch (T. 27)
defendant the watch and he returned lu the house.

r

i

- t.

-

A :ew minutes

later, both defendant and Robert came out of the house and gave
Ericson the second baggy (T. 28). Defendant then returned to the
house and Ericson and the Informant drove Robert back to Poncho's
(T. 28).
Ericson and the informant immediately rendezvoused with
the backup officers and Ericson handed over the baggies (T. 29).
The contents of the baggies were subsequently chemically tested
and determined to be cocaine (T. 93-103).
. Defendant presented one witness en -is ow;. behalf,
Oscar Gonzales (T. 116). Oscar testified that
Robert and defendant were at a pool tournan>^

n March 30th,
.0-12 1).

Originally, UP had nui remembered what day of the week the
tournament was, but claimed he was sure it was the 30th.
In rebuttal, the state call eci Robert, Garcia, who .
corroborateil1 officer Ericson's recollection of the drug
transaction.

Robert testified that some time in late Mar "•

early April, he and defendant had exchanged cocaine for what they

-5-

thought to be stolen clothes (T. 137-139).

He also stated that

around the same time, but not the same day, he and defendant had
played in a pool tournament with Oscar Gonzales (T. 141-142).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Based on the evidence presented at trial, together with
all reasonable inferences, there is sufficient evidence to
sustain defendant's conviction for distribution and/or arranging
to distribute a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine.
ARGUMENT
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL TOGETHER WITH
ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES IS SUFFICIENT TO
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR
DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE.
Defendant's sole argument raised on appeal is that the
evidence presented at trial is insufficient to sustain his
conviction for distribution of a controlled substance, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (Supp 1990), which
reads, in pertinent part:
[l](a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(ii) distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance, or to agree,
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute
a controlled or counterfeit substance[.]
• • •

(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I
or II is guilty of a second degree
felonyf.]
In making this argument, defendant does not attack the
admission of any evidence, the instructions to the jury, or any
ruling of the court.

Instead, it is limited to whether or not

the jury should have believed Officer Ericson and Robert Garcia

-6-

w h e n they testified that defendant had aided noberi in
il i isti J hut i ij f IK

cocaine.

T h e standard for review of a sufficiency of evidence
challenge is well-established by i.h*

• appellate c o u r t s ,

defendant c o n c e d e s , t h e evidence m u s t t

As

viewed in t h e light most

favorable to t h e jury verdict and w i l l only b e deemed
insufficient w h e n the verdict "is suffi ciently inconclusive or ;
inherently improbable that reasonable minds m u s t have entertained
a r e a s o n a b l e doubt that t h e defendant committed the crime of
which

State v. J o h n s o n , 1 7 4 P. 2d 1 141 , 1147

< wa& convicted."

(Utah 1989),

Accord State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 903-04 (Utah

App. Ct. 1990)..

It is not the appellate court's duty to wei.gh

conflicting evidence or tl le credibility of witnesses. An
appellate court "does not have the prerogative to substitute its
judgment on the credibility of witnesses for that of the factfinder."

State v. Hopkins, 782 P. ? i 5 "

Accord State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23,

47 7 (Utah 1989).

> (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

(citing State v. Booker, 709 P.2d J><*Z,

(lit ah 1985)).

Unless the prosecution's account of the facts appears
to be so lacking and insubstantial that the jury must necessarily
have entertained a reasonable doubt that ihe ciefendant committed
the ci' ime charged, d reviewing court is obligated to assume the
jury believed the evidence which supports th€^ jury verdict.
State v. Brooks, 631 P. 2d 878, 884 (Utah I'9111"!

A conviction

wi ] 1 not be overturi led merely because the jury chose to
disbelieve the defendant's evidence.
905; State v

Lacto< •.

7.

•
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State v. Jonas, 7 93 P. ?d at:

The deference given to the jury verdict compels the
requirement that when a sufficiency of the evidence argument is
made on appeal, an appellant must "marshal all the evidence" in
support of the jury verdict and then "demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable" to the verdict, the
evidence is insufficient.

State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv. Rep. 28,

32 (Utah Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1990).

Where an appellant fails to

marshal the evidence, he has waived review of the sufficiency
claim.

Id.
Here, defendant argues that Officer Ericson must have

been mistaken in her identification of defendant since Oscar
Gonzales testified that he was with defendant on the night of
March 30th.

In effect, defendant is simply "urgfing] essentially

the same points raised at trial."

State v. Moore, 147 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 32. As such, he has failed to adequately marshal the
evidence as required for appellate review.
Even if this Court addressed defendant's claim on the
merits, the evidence amply supports the jury verdict.

A police

officer identified defendant as being one of two individuals
involved in a hand-to-hand sale of cocaine occurring on March
30th.

Defendant refuted that the incident took place on the 30th

through Oscar Gonzales, who testified that on that date he was
with defendant.

The codefendant, Robert Garcia, reconciled any

conflict when he testified that both incidents had occurred.

He

and defendant had sold cocaine to Officer Ericson as described
and, he and defendant had played in a pool tournament with Oscar
Gonzales.

Both events took place around the same period, the end
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of March or beginning of April, but he was unsure of the date of
either.
Any conflict as to the exact date of the crime was not
material to its proof.

Based on the totality of the evidence,

together with all reasonable inferences, the jury had
overwhelming support for their conclusion that defendant
distributed and/or arranged the distribution of cocaine "on or
about" March 30, 1990.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction for
distribution of and/or arranging to distribute a controlled
substance should be affirmed.
DATED this

^t~

v^^^^
day of < L ^ e c e vA\^loe-v

, 1990.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

^CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
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